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## How does relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence? A case study of Bangladesh

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HOW DOES RELATIVE DEPRIVATION CAUSE PEOPLE TO CONDONE  
POLITICAL VIOLENCE? A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

By

MD MAMUNUR RASHID

B.S.S., University of Dhaka, 2015

2020

Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

May 04, 2020

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Md Mamunur Rashid ENTITLED How does Relative Deprivation Cause People to Condone Political Violence? A Case Study of Bangladesh BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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## ABSTRACT

Rashid, Md Mamunur. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Program, Wright State University, 2020. How does Relative Deprivation Cause People to Condone Political Violence? A Case Study of Bangladesh.

How does relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence?

This thesis investigates this question by utilizing survey data conducted in Bangladesh. Scarcity of public resources, lethal political confrontation and poor resource allocation make Bangladesh a fertile ground for violence. Although the survey suggests a relationship exists between relative deprivation and the public attitude toward condoning political violence, the regression analysis reveals that the relationship is imprecise. Small sample size, lack of technical capacity, and limited applicability of the foundational theory may have caused this imprecise outcome. The study concludes by providing recommendations for future research to undertake a mixed method for this sensitive topic.

**Keywords:** Bangladesh, relative deprivation, political violence, leadership and citizenry approach of violence.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

BAL- Bangladesh Awami League

BNP- Bangladesh Nationalist Party

OLS- Ordinarily Least Squares

USA- United States of America



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## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

Political violence is a harsh reality for many countries in the developing world. However, within academia it is possible to investigate the many varieties of political violence to help mitigate this challenge. This thesis will explore how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. It focuses on a specific case country, namely Bangladesh, which is selected through a scientific approach. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the research question: how does relative deprivation cause people to support or condone political violence?

Modernization theorists Lipset (1963), Rostow (1960), Apter (1967), and others in the 1960s have suggested that if countries of the developing world follow the path of development through industrialization they would be able to institutionalize democracy, civil, and human rights. The theory of modernization has capitalized on evidence drawn from industrialized democracies in Europe. As part of democratic development, western nations gain strong control over political violence. However, the modernization theory has faced criticism because when developing nations industrialize, instead of making progress, as Collier and Rohner (2008) point out, "the below... income threshold democracy increases proneness to political violence" (p.531). Recent studies in the field of political violence have contributed in many ways to the understanding of why political violence prevails in the Global South. Some studies have suggested that ideological differences among contending political groups as well as deep ethnic divisions encourage the political system to resort to violence (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006; Wilkinson, 2004). However, the vast majority of the literature investigates different approaches to political violence, such as how incumbents use violence to influence voters' attitude, how perceived insecurity makes people vote for a violent leader, and identifying the trends and patterns of political violence that leaders usually follow (Onapajo, 2014; Höglund, 2009; Suykens & Islam, 2015).

Most of the existing debate only deals with the leadership perspective of political violence. Although the citizen approach has branched out from the broader domain of the leadership approach, scholarly contributions to the citizen approach are limited. This study focuses on understanding the citizenry approach of political violence, specifically, how does relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence? The research leverages the idea of resource scarcity and the gap between “legitimate expectation and actuality” (Gurr T., 1968, p. 253), which suggests that frustration pits people against the political system. When voters place their demand (inputs) into the political system (processing unit) but receive no results (outcomes), combined with watching other voters' demands being met with rewards, deprived voters develop vindictive sentiments, eventually leading to condoning violence committed against the reward-winner. In brief, when an individual feels relatively deprived based on political preference, that individual will condone political violence. Average citizens often find themselves relatively deprived based on their political ideologies in a number of ways for instance, access to public health care facilities.

The gap between legitimate expectation and reality makes people become frustrated, eventually developing a condoning attitude toward violence. Often it is challenging to calculate the expectation gap and attitudes toward condoning violence. Numerous contributions to the literature suggest different parameters to measure deprivation, including housing, food, transportation, communication, healthcare, and education (McKay & Collard, 2003; Gordon, 1995; Walker & Pettigrew, 2011). However, it is comparatively challenging to determine public sentiment toward condoning violence. In general, violence is considered as an unacceptable social event which people don't want to support publically (Lobbestael, 2015). To deal with the challenges of finding out the latent attitudes of condoning violence, the vignette method is often implemented through experimental survey (Atzmülle & Steiner,

2009). Thus for empirical evidence, this study will base its data on a secondary source to study the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence (Haque, 2019).

Rather than limit its scope within a region, this study follows a scientific method to determine its optimal case study. As developed democracies limit tolerance for violence and authoritarian regimes offer limited empirical evidence, this study seeks to focus on a list of developing countries where violence is prevalent. Here Bangladesh is shortlisted based on the Economist's democracy index and availability of technical resources (Economist, 2018).

This study attempts to provide insight into the citizenry approach of political violence. The existing literature in the field of political violence is predominantly leadership-oriented. The leadership approach deals with how leaders use political violence as a tool to protect and protract power. The process to protect and protract power consists of numerous methods, for example: depriving one group compared to others, boosting ethnic division, public resource allocation and promoting religious factions. The vicissitudes of the leadership approach of political violence make it clear that new research should move forward with a different approach which can contribute to diminishing the knowledge gap. This research attempts to present the foundation in one of the under-researched approaches to analyzing political violence which will help advance the study of violence and paint a comprehensive picture of this mechanism. Although there are enormous challenges in analyzing the citizenry approach of violence, this study attempts to establish the basic foundation for that approach. The findings of this study illustrate how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. The outcomes of the study could help policymakers address deprivation issues that trigger mass condoning of political violence.

The basic premise of this study relies on survey data derived from a secondary source; as a result, the statistical significance of the data will largely influence the overall conclusion of this study. There are two major parts of the dataset: independent variables and dependent

variables. The survey maker has placed the independent variables at the forefront of the survey and the dependent variables at the end.

Basically, the survey maker has drawn the deprivation indicators from the violence literature of western writers like McKay and Collard (2003), Walker and Pettigrew (2011), and Gordon (1995). The indicators used by those scholars are primarily targeted to understanding the deprivation status in developed countries. As a result those borrowed deprivation indicators can fall short of determining the deprivation status of a developing country like Bangladesh. For example, the survey contains a deprivation question related to accommodation: how many people do you share a bedroom with? For a developed country, sharing bedroom with more than three people is rare, while it is common in Bangladesh. As a result, any question related to accommodation can overwhelmingly produce the same high score for the majority respondents.

However, the dependent variables are established to identify the extent to which the respondents condone political violence. The challenge here is to determine how credible and open the respondents are. Lobbestael (2015) argues that people do not want to expose themselves to danger even if they support political violence. Additionally, conducting a survey through a vignette questionnaire requires expert interviewers who can present a convincing scenario for the respondents. Thus, the actual representation is crucial while subtle insincerity can distort the outcomes.

Moreover, the survey maker followed a random sampling method to reach respondents from diverse backgrounds in an attempt to ensure that the sample can represent the actual demography of Bangladesh, despite its small N size of only 156 observations. Hence it is cautioned that the sample size of the study may not be random enough. The small sample size hints at additional dimensions required to fully conceptualize the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence.

This chapter presents the basic foundation of this study along with its scope and limitations. This study seeks to answer the following question: how does relative deprivation push people to support or condone political violence? To investigate the question this study uses quantitative survey data which is designed to calculate levels of deprivation and the tendency to condone violence. The findings are expected to bring deeper nuance to the citizenry approach of violence. This study will also expose the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence.

The following section reviews the literature on this subject and is followed by a theory and hypothesis discussion. This research concludes with a methodological discussion of the case, analysis, and recommendations for future research.

## ***CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW***

This section seeks to determine the factors that cause people to condone political violence in a democracy. Given that a consolidated democracy intentionally rejects the adoption of violence, this research identifies what makes a citizen of an unconsolidated democracy to condone political violence. Democracy scholars have argued that contending ideology, political polarization and the tendency to protract and protect power influence leaders of developing nations to pursue violent tactics. Violent events can be used as a tool during an electoral year, but periodic use of violence to control resource distribution also may be a factor. Social psychologists have argued that long term exposure to violence encourages greater support for violence in a population. Additionally, the gap between legitimate expectation and reality may elicit greater support for violence.

### **The debate over democracy**

The simplest way to define democracy is a system of government ruled by the people (V-Dem, 2015, p. 9). However, these few words leave plenty of room for the addition of more illustrative and normative descriptions, which has led to the ongoing debate over defining democracy. Schmitter and Karl (1991) have argued that as democracy is “not a single set of institutions,” it is, “contingent upon a country's socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices” (p.76). In defining democracy based on the scope of government, two different schools of thought have emerged: the thick and thin concept. The “thin” conception of democracy consists of “procedural arrangements” while the “thick” conception emphasizes a “morally infused substantive account” (Allan, 2006, p. 534). Although it is important understand the application of both the thick and thin concepts when analyzing a democracy, some scholars emphasize one over the other. For instance, V-Dem (2015) has presented six different concepts to explain the significant varieties of democracy such as: (i) liberal principle to protect individual rights, (ii) majoritarian

principle to the will of the sovereign majority, (iii) consensual principle to include maximum possible perspective, (iv) participatory principle to participate in political process (v) deliberative principle to make informed decision for the public, and (vi) egalitarian principle to establish political equality for all (pp. 23-26). Advocating the opposite, however, Allan (2006) has predominantly rejected the significance of the thick concept. The author evaluates the case of Zimbabwe where the voting process is hindered by fraud and corruption. Thus in this case the thin concept of democracy would simply conclude that Zimbabwe is not a democracy while the thick concept establishes, with greater nuance, that Zimbabwe is not democratic because the voters' preference has been ignored (Allan, 2006).

The debate over democracy remains incomplete without addressing democratic consolidation. According to Schedler democratic consolidation is a continuous process which includes but is not limited to upholding democratic values, neutralization of anti-system actors, and routinization of politics (Schedler, 1998, pp. 91-92). However, with a very specific view, Robert Dahl has argued that democratic consolidation refers to a fair, competitive, and inclusive election with civil and political rights (Dahl, 1971). David Collier (as cited in Power & Powers, 1988) contends that there are three approaches to defining democratic consolidation: (i) the actor-oriented approach deals with the willingness of political actors to operate within the democratic rules, (ii) the event-oriented approach focuses on whether political events fall within constitutional limits, and (iii) the institution-oriented approach evaluates institutionalization and meaningful changes. Consolidation of democracy is an unfinished process that begins with a transition to democracy and depends on the success of sustaining the transition. According to Beetham (1994) maintaining the consolidation process is much more difficult and extensive than the transition itself and as a result, "not all who make the transition will be able to sustain it" (pp. 159-160). However, some scholars pose contradictory views to Dahl's conception of democracy, contending that



regular elections and the fair transition of power with political rights alone cannot fully portray consolidation (Beetham, 1994). There are some criteria present in the democracy literature which are universally used to define whether a democracy is consolidated or non-consolidated, such as: (a) freedom of association and communication, (b) free and inclusive electoral contestation, (c) constitutionalism and rule of law, (d) state adherence to legal national bureaucratic principles and (e) economic growth and respect for property rights (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Any nations whose governance mechanisms fall under these criteria are considered consolidated democracies and otherwise are identified as non-consolidated.

### **How does democracy differ in terms of political violence?**

Ideal democracies are depicted in the literature as ensuring public participation in choosing who governs whom and what rules are applied to limit behaviors for both leaders and followers. Moreover, there are several indicators that measure the health of a democracy, such as equality, mutual trust among citizens, and the government's accountability (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006; Cunningham, 2002). However, as many developing democracies started emerging only after World War II, the conception of the ideal democracy, adorned with nuanced principles imported from consolidated democracies proved unfit to explain the more complex emerging democracies. Rostow (1960), a staunch advocate of modernization theory, has suggested that gradual industrial development and economic takeoff will enable “the emergence to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization of the economy as serious, high-order political business” (p. 8). There are criticisms against this economic emphasis, however, particularly the assertion that industrialization in the developing world eventually leads to full-fledged democracy (Rostow, 1960, pp. 4-16). Caldeira and Holston (1999) have recognized the stark distinction between “non-western” and “canonized Euro-American democracies”. Although with altered views, Powell (1981) and Caldeira and Holston (1999) have suggested that there can be a distinctive scale to

understand the performance of a democracy, based on a political system's capacity of containing political violence. With an eye on investigating the distribution of historical legacies of violent political events, Hoppen (1994) qualifies the assumptions implied by Caldeira and Holston (1999) that the existence of political violence was common even in 1840s western democracies. Throughout the literature, there are attempts to understand the differences between developed and developing democracies, which have resulted in a consensus that political violence is a differentiating feature.

### **Can violence be used as a political tool?**

Bohara (2006) and Wilkinson (2004) have argued that political parties or contesting ideologies can incite violence against those who opt for rival political ideologies or ethnic identity. More specifically, Onapajo (2014) points out that an incumbent political party can selectively use political violence to influence the voter. Although Bohara (2006), Wilkinson (2004), and Onapajo (2014) have argued that violence is a means of achieving certain political objectives, the literature has yet to fully categorize trends and patterns of violence and their relationship to the levels of political expectations. Hoppen (1994) categorizes the trends of violence into two broader categories, namely (i) crime against individuals (e.g. murder, and stabbing) and (ii) crime against property (e.g. forgery, bigamy, and 'unnatural' acts), but the author does not address how this categorization is associated with political outcomes (pp. 601-2). Moreover, while Bohara (2006) contributes to the study of violence from the perspective of an insurgency, Onapajo (2014) and Höglund (2009) identify three major phases of violence: pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral. Bohara (2006) and Onapajo (2014) conclude that incumbent political parties perpetrate higher levels of electoral violence because electoral violence is one of the affordable means to influence an electoral outcome. Unambiguously, the widespread use of violence can cause voters to refrain from registering to vote, and even trigger fear psychosis that can influence challengers to leave the

field (Höglund 2009; Onapajo 2014). In a state of political violence, even though there would be reduced electoral participation, Höglund (2009) notes that “people may vote for security, rather than to elect leaders based on their democratic merits” (p. 415). From the surveyed literature it is clear that political violence can be used to influence a political environment.

### **Why violence works**

According to Blattman contemporary conflict literature is more concerned with the impact of voting on violence than the converse (Blattman, 2009, p. 231) Furthermore, the author suggests two seemingly opposing effects of political violence on voting behavior. On the one hand, political violence can create a positive impact on political participation; on the other hand political violence diminishes political participation. Blattman (2009) argues that violence can lead to greater political participation, supported by the positive impact of traumatic events (p. 231). Here, the scholar suggests that the positive impact of traumatic events can be caused by abduction, torture and violence witnessed by participants who are politically active. However, Trelles and Carreras (2012) contend the opposite, arguing that political violence reduces overall voter turnout. Both Trelles and Carreras (2012) and Blattman (2009) develop intuitive causal logic in their theories, but while backed by empirical evidence, the data for both is somewhat constrained. Blattman (2009) deals extensively with civil war whereas Trelles and Carreras (2012) derive their evidence exclusively from Mexico. Trelles and Carreras’s (2012) definition of criminal violence leaves plenty of room for interpretation, such as differentiating politically targeted violence from violence associated with other social issues like drug cartels and arms smuggling. Jones, Troesken, and Walsh (2017) draw similar conclusions but their connection of violence and political participation is limited to the lynching of black voters in the American South. These two camps have many adherents, but the school of thought which has contended that violence contributes to increasing electoral participation has been unable to provide empirical

evidence to prove its point. Bateson (2012), for instance, concludes that crime victimization increases political participation whereas Blattman (2009) suggests electoral violence can lead to greater turnout during a civil war. Bateson (2012) and Blattman (2009) reach similar conclusions, but their contributions to the literature lack conclusive empirical evidence to back their arguments. Nevertheless, amongst the surveyed literature for this paper it is evident that to some extent political violence can increase political participation.

### **What causes elites and masses to condone violence?**

The foundation of violence study has two major schools of thought: (i) people are naturally peaceful, or (ii) innately violence-prone. The great eighteenth century European scholar Thomas Hobbes (as cited in Singh, 1976) contends that men are intrinsically violence-prone, living lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," whereas contemporary John Locke argues that men are naturally good and gentle in their way of life. However, the gap between these schools of thought is reduced by present-day rational and empirical analyses.

Studies of political violence tend to examine the process in which people engage in violent events. According to Lichabach and Zuckerman (2009) many contributions to the violence literature focus on the question "How and why do people use violence to extend their political will over others or to defend their political position?" (p. 84). There are two major components to this question: (i) violence as a means to extend political will over others and (ii) violence as a means to defend political positions. Often the difference between these two sections is marginal or mutually exclusive because the tendency to extend political will can be done by leaders or followers. Lichabach and Zuckerman (2009) have also suggested that political violence can be used as a means to political end in a number of ways. Basically, the political end determines who is the violent actor. Thus, any systematic study to understand why political leaders use violence as a strategic tool to justify their political end

falls under the category of leadership approach, while citizenry approach deals with how political violence offers personal incentives for a citizen. For instance, a leader can perpetrate violence against civilians in order to defend the regime, an ethnic leader can be violent in the face of a potential threat, and during election season a leader can incite riots out of fear of losing votes. Here each leaders' tendency to adopt violence stems from their requirement to maintain hold on power . As a result any violence studies relating to a leader maintaining their political power falls under the leadership approach. However, Kalyvas (2006) suggests that the politicalization of private life can motivate people to engage in violence influenced by polarization, hatred and greed Kalyvas (2006) cautions that the "privatization of politics" can easily be confused with "the politicalization of private life" (p. 332). It is often difficult to distinguish whether an ordinary citizen is driven to violence by political motivations or in seeking personal revenge against friends and neighbors.

In Fearon and Laitin's (2000) analysis of ethnic conflict, the authors divide violence by an elite and nonelite (follower) approach. They conceptualize violence as "explained as both a means and a by-product of political elites' efforts to hold or acquire power" (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 853). They also contend that elites provoke violence to increase political support, which creates more hostile attitudes among followers and results in an environment more conducive to violence. However, nonelite violence provocation can happen to raise their in-group position while personal motivations like looting, land grabs, and revenge also contribute to nonelite violence engagement (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 874).

Gurr's hypothesis is more likely aligned with the leadership perception of violence: "the causal sequence in political violence is; first, the development of discontent, second, the politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors" (Gurr T. R., 1970, pp. 13-14). Höglund (2009) argues that the need for security drives citizens to go vote for someone who is violent. In Weintraub, Vargas, and

Flores study of the 2014 Colombian presidential election, the authors state that in insurgency violence, support for a candidate who opposes peace might increase and support for a pro-peace process might decrease (Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores, 2015, p. 3). Utilizing arguments grounded in political psychology some scholars maintain that long-time exposure to violence can make people support militant policies and parties (Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2015; Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2012).

Also important is an understanding of the literature on violence sponsored by political parties: what makes people participate in collective political violence in developing democracies? Answers can be divided into three different sections: (i) individual identity within a group, (ii) protection and protraction of power, and (iii) resource allocation politics. Littman and Paluck (2015) suggest a clear problem of endogeneity, where “group identification motivates violent behavior and violent behavior increases identification with a violent group” (p. 79). The authors claim that groups recruit their members and motivate them to engage in violence to pursue economic, political, and social goals (Littman & Paluck, 2015). Often, these kinds of collective organizations motivate their members in such a way that they are encouraged to go beyond individual integrity in the perpetration of violence, under the pretext of acting in the group's collective interest. The question that arises is what do they fight for? Is it a fight against government suppression, a fight against other political parties, ethnic groups or special interest groups? While there are several possible answers, intergroup conflict based on the scarcity of resources is one of the most compelling reasons for violence.

A recent body of literature deals with the relationship between electoral results, resource allocation, and political violence. Chaturvedi (2005) and Boone (2011) have argued that in emerging democracies, political parties deploy muscle power, sometimes through party activists, student leaders, or professional bullying agents. As Chaturvedi (2005) states,

this is done “either to force ideological supporters of the competing party to vote in their favour or restrain them from voting” (p. 189). Chaturvedi (2005) further suggests that a party with lower initial support can resort to more violence than others. However, if the incumbent deploys resources, then the competition becomes more violent. Boone (2011) on the other hand, argues that politicians intentionally allocate certain land rights to favor their supporters and to punish their opponents, consequently inducing massive land-related violence around elections. While it is clear that leaders have incentives to support violence, it remains unclear why voters support violence. Gurr (1968) attempts to address that by suggesting that when there is a gap between an individual's expectations and the actuality, that individual gets angry and frustrated. Gurr's deprivation argument serves as the theoretical backbone of this assumption.

Although the majority of the literature on political violence deals with the leadership perspective other perspectives like the citizen approach are not necessarily excluded. However, from among the surveyed literature, there are few works that include the citizenry perspective on violence.

### **The theory of relative deprivation and political violence**

Gurr (1972) presents three major psychological theories of violence, as (i) instinctual aggression, (ii) learned aggression and, (iii) aggression activated by frustration (p.33). While there are contending views on whether aggressive behavior is an instinct, Gurr proposes it is most likely a learned behavior that gets picked up in one's environment. Sometimes aggressive behavior is “purposive” and goal-oriented against a rival group of individuals (Gurr, 1968, p. 250). Moreover, long term exposure to a violent political environment often makes people tolerant and indifferent towards violence. The theory advanced here relies on Gurr's third perspective on aggression: it can be induced by frustration.

Voters in a consolidated democracy are often moved by developmental approaches portrayed by leaders; basically, underlying promises define for whom to vote. By embarking on the democratic voyage, citizens are promised that their voices will be heard. They will have a say on how laws are written, rights interpreted, and resources allocated. In the early days of a developing democracy, citizens organically develop specific expectations, most of which are based on what citizens of developed democracies have been able to achieve. According to Gurr (1968), the condoning of violence happens when voters are deprived of those expectations, in what he terms the gap between legitimate expectation and actuality (p. 253). As groups of voters become deprived by their opponents, despite the presence of democracy, they become frustrated. These frustrations are often intensified by relative deprivation based on ideological preferences: opposition versus incumbent. As mentioned earlier, the sequence of political violence follows the development of discontent, the politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Here, the development of discontent can be politically motivated by groupings among competing ideological forces, but an individual as part of an ideological group can follow the same process of actualization in violent action against political actors.

While opposing political parties might be blamed for their feelings of frustration, their higher level of abstraction shields them from becoming the targets of this frustration: it is simply too unfulfilling to place blame on an entity or institution. Opposition voters, on the other hand, are not abstract. They are real, voters know who they are, interact with and can put a face on them. This “concreteness” tricks the frustrated voter into switching blame from the party to the party supporter. The countenance of violence is simply the manifestation of their frustration: if opposition voters are responsible for their frustration, then any violence that befalls them is well deserved. When a voter has been harboring violent or vindictive feelings towards another group of voters, they will naturally gravitate towards an actor who



delivers violence against that frustration maker. Instead of rejecting that violence as undemocratic, feelings of frustration will direct that person toward interpreting violence as rightful retribution for having caused their frustration. In other words, frustration will cause that violence to be interpreted as deserved. Over time, a repeating mechanism develops in which deprivation fuels anger, anger fuels frustration, and frustration causes people to condone political violence. This mechanism is the underlying argument for the hypothesis developed here.

### **Hypothesis**

When people see there is a gap between their legitimate expectation and actuality they feel relatively deprived. As a result, they feel vindictive towards those who are responsible for the deprivation. Consequently, people feeling this vindictive sentiment throw their support behind political violence, if not directly, then condoning any violent event happening before them.

**Hypothesis:** *Greater deprivation will yield higher support for political violence while lesser deprivation will garner lower support for political violence.*

After considering all the surveyed literature, it can be concluded that developing democracies lack important norms and standard procedures of governance which are necessary for the better functioning of a nation. As a result, there is a gap between public expectations and reality. The larger gap means greater deprivation, and when there are deprivations among those who have not received equal treatment resentment builds towards those who have. Vindictive sentiment as a result of deprivation encourages aggrieved individuals to condone violence perpetrated against the others.

### ***CHAPTER THREE: CASE SELECTION***

#### **Where and how to calculate the relationship between relative deprivation and support for political violence**

Political violence is prevalent in several countries. Primarily, this research utilizes the 2018 The Economist's Democracy Index to shortlist some countries which are average-performing democracies. Keeping limitations in mind, this study focuses on studying Bangladesh as the best case for analysis. Confrontational political culture provides a breeding ground for massive political violence in Bangladesh. Moreover, scarcity of public resources creates improper distribution system which ultimately yields room for deprivation in the country. This section accounts for the case selection process followed by a conceptual background on political violence in Bangladesh.

#### **The Selection Process**

Political violence as a social phenomenon is present on almost every continent, from Africa to Latin America and Asia. To study the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence, this study first must establish which countries fulfill two major conditions: (i) they are a moderately performing democracy, and (ii) a country with scarce public resources. To accomplish this, an appropriate indicator for democratic performance must be determined. The objective is to find a case which is just above the borderline of dictatorship but below the line of above-average performing democracies. Although there could be relative deprivation-driven political violence in a dictatorial country like North Korea, Afghanistan, or Myanmar, this study rejects these cases because there will be limited access to data for those countries. On the other hand, this study should not include any democracy which is performing above average, like United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), and France because a democracy with little scarcity in public resources will more likely promote peace instead of political violence. To narrow the list of potential countries,

this study has utilized a ready-to-use tool, the “2018 Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (Economist, 2018).” The index itself does not provide any insight into the level of relative deprivation in the case country even though it can be a powerful instrument to serve the purpose of the study. However, in applying the democracy index, several Southeast Asian countries are compatible with the criteria. The democracy index has identified these countries as 'hybrids' because they are just above the dictatorship margin but below the above-average performing democracies defined as 'flawed democracy.'

The list of countries with the desired attributes includes Thailand, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Thailand and Bhutan must be excluded because Thailand is currently governed by a military government and Bhutan's adoption of democracy is too recent to serve the purposes of this study. Pakistan and Nepal also must be excluded because these two countries exhibit significant inter-ethnic violence which could muddle the data collection process. It is difficult to separate ethnic violence from electoral violence. As such, Bangladesh emerges as the best option among the remaining three countries.

Political violence in Bangladesh has drawn the attention of the media, scholars, and social commentators. Hussain Zillur Rahman, a prominent Bangladeshi social analyst, argues that political violence in Bangladesh is better understood through power dynamics. Rahman (1990) classifies these as, “how power motivates the aspiring individual, how ruling groups accumulate, hold and exercise power within society, and finally to what extent overt violations of social norms of justice impinge upon threshold levels of tolerance of the common people” (p. 2622). Individual power entrepreneurs in Bangladesh do whatever is needed to protect and prolong their power. They rely on power brokers (such as local cadres, students, or professional agents of violence) to facilitate their transactions. Ruling elites in Bangladesh accumulate power by rigging elections, orchestrating bureaucratic favors and often using their incumbency with little regard for constitutional prescriptions. Constitutional

prescription is here defined as basic human rights like freedom and liberty to work, self-expression, access to food, health, and schooling. Incumbents use these basic human rights principles as the basis of discrimination against their opponents, using favored resource allocation. In their efforts to maintain control, Bangladeshi political elites often turn to violence as their tool of choice. Several triggers have been associated with outbreaks of political violence in Bangladesh, the most common being public resource allocation and distribution, electoral rigging, favoring contractors who support the incumbent government in different public development projects, illegal river dredging projects, speaking up against the regime, suppressing the opposition, and war crimes tribunals (Suykens & Islam, 2015). A large portion of political violence is state-sponsored, also known as extrajudicial killings. With levels of democracy matching the requirements imposed by the theory and political violence being such a well-documented part of the Bangladeshi political environment, it naturally rises as an appropriate case for the test.

### **Background of Relative Deprivation and Political Violence in Bangladesh**

Bangladesh has a long, confrontational political history starting in 1971 after the political separation from Pakistan. Although a democratic government was initially established, repeated military interventions into politics have hampered the smooth function of democracy. The restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991 inherited many political attributes that have hindered the government's development. The emergent Bangladesh democracy after 1991 features "a wide array of confrontation, competition, monopolization of state institutions and (public) resources by the party in power" (Osman, 2010, p. 310). Osman (2010) has argued that politics by its very nature is confrontational because it has to deal with conflicting interests. The success of a polity depends on the capacity to balance conflicting demands to minimize potential damage.

The confrontational politics of Bangladesh offer a breeding ground for intense political competition to mobilize and monopolize public resources by the winning political party while depriving the loser. There are some underlying approaches portrayed by Osman (2010) which supply the foundation of the political system in Bangladesh such as:

### **Clientelism and Relative Deprivation**

Similar to other countries in the Global South, Bangladesh is marked by clientelism. In this country, political leaders offer protection similar to a patron, while in exchange voters give them support for their activities. Clientelism works in this democracy because public resources are monopolized by the winning power, leaving no room for voters as a client to go against them. Clientelism is the lifeblood of violent, insecure, and confrontational political systems (Migdal, 1988). Clientelism persists in Bangladesh despite its pernicious attributes because the country lacks political leaders are forced to utilize very limited public resources judiciously to protect and protract their power. Politicians apply those public resources in two ways: (i) to attract people from opposing groups, and (ii) to retain its in-group members. Because Bangladesh has a scarcity of public resources, any allocation by state leaders to their preferred group, ensures relative deprivation.

### **Political Party, Criminality and Violence**

Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the nation has been broadly divided into two major political camps (Jahan, 2014). Both of these camps are strong enough to polarize the nation into two different blocks. Although there are several other political parties which play into the political system, generally the political system comes under the umbrella of either the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) or Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). BAL is a more secular and progressive political party while the BNP is a nationalistic and religious political party. According to Moniruzzaman, “a dominant aspect of the party-system in

Bangladesh is its culture of violence. It has become commonplace for political parties to often engage in street violence (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 84).”

Each prime political party has its youth-student wing which serves as the mechanism for perpetrating violence (Moniruzzaman, 2009). International Crisis Group has reported that “they (student-youth groups) are used to expand influence and entrench control, often by force, over resources and turf, including on college campuses” (ICG, 2016, p. 4). The political party in power exploits the state mechanism to suppress the opposition while the opposition spares no opportunity to destabilize the incumbent (Khan S. R., 2014). Odhikar, one of the prominent human rights organization in Bangladesh, describes Bangladeshi political culture as “relentlessly violent” (ICG, 2016, p. 4). From 2002 to 2013 there have been 14,187 violent incidents among which more than 40 per cent of the events are classified as inter-party violence between BAL and BNP (Suykens & Islam, 2015). The two tables (Table 1 and 2) below show the distribution of political violence in Bangladesh from 2002 to 2013 as well as actor engagement percentage.

**Table 1**

*The distribution of political violence in Bangladesh from 2002 to 2013*

	Events		Wounded		Lethal Casualties	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
2002	668	4.7%	6015	4.8%	113	4.7%
2003	639	4.5%	5833	4.6%	116	4.8%
2004	910	6.4%	9433	7.5%	170	7.0%
2005	989	7.0%	7896	6.2%	271	11.2%
2006	2051	14.5%	21607	17.1%	330	13.7%
2007	274	1.9%	1689	1.3%	90	3.7%
2008	379	2.7%	2413	1.9%	84	3.5%
2009	985	6.9%	5975	4.7%	105	4.4%
2010	993	7.0%	8542	6.8%	139	5.7%
2011	1096	7.7%	12159	9.6%	124	5.1%
2012	1333	9.4%	14442	11.4%	109	4.5%
2013	3870	27.3%	30353	24.0%	765	31.7%
Total	14187	100%	126355	100%	2418	100%

*Note:* Data for political violence in Bangladesh is derived from Suykens and Islam (2015)

**Table 2***Involvement of major actors in violent events in Bangladesh (from 2002 to 2013)*

	Events		Wounded		Lethal Casualties	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bangladesh Awami League (BAL)	6330	44.8%	58578	46.4%	536	22.3%
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	6240	44.1%	66112	52.4%	640	26.6%
State Actor	3521	24.9%	54963	43.6%	1279	53.1%
Jamat-e-Islam	2076	14.7%	18210	14.4%	450	18.7%

*Note:* Data for major actors of violent events in Bangladesh is derived from Suykens and

Islam (2015)

### **Manifestation of Political Violence**

An analysis of Bangladeshi political culture is necessary to grasp the magnitude of political violence in the nation. Essentially, Bangladeshi political culture is rooted in two kinds of interactions between leaders and followers: (i) institutional: such as boycotts and strikes, and (ii) non-institutional: such as threats, extortion and murder. However, Moniruzzaman points out in Bangladesh, “institutional interaction between parties is largely overshadowed by non-institutional methods of interaction, which create the scope for political violence” (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 91).

Additionally, Moniruzzaman (2009) has argued that boycotts are a necessary instrument for opposition parties in a healthy democracy. Opposition parties in Bangladesh frequently use these tactics to undermine the party in power. As a result, the incumbent government gets the opportunity to make the best out of the absence of the opposition. However, these boycotts primarily take place when opposition parties are deprived of their rights to voice concern for any policy, law or bill. According to Ahmed “The usual reasons given for parliamentary boycott are: not giving the opposition a fair chance to speak in parliament, partisan behavior of the speaker, rejection of opposition motions and breaching

the privileges of the opposition” (Ahmed, 2002, p. 203). The outcome of boycotts becomes messy when the opposition party takes the issue to the streets. As Moniruzzaman has describes “Armed confrontations on such occasions usually end in bloodshed which leads the opposition to a tougher stand, thereby taking boycott politics to a higher level (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 92). Boycott and strikes are two of the institutional instruments which are frequently misused by political parties of Bangladesh. These institutional instruments breed other non-institutional violent events exposing general people towards a circle of violent political culture.

Extortion, murder and treats are considered as non-institutional instruments of violence. Non-institutional means, formally those events have no constitutional backup or recognition as they involve unjustified physical or mental trauma. According to Hossain during 1995 alone there were more than 5,000 cases of violence: 60,000 crimes were recorded that included 1,300 killings, 1,100 abductions and 2,900 cases of torture (Hossain, 1996, pp. 198-199). Bangladeshi political culture encourages political parties to ask their supporters and loyalists to be violent and aggressive towards their opponents. Any non-institutional violent event breeds further violent events as response to the initial event.

As mentioned previously, this study seeks to establish the optimal case country based on two criteria, (i) its democratic performance, and (ii) level of deprivation based on public resource distribution. Bangladesh meets these criteria because it is an average-performing democratic country and citizens are relatively deprived based on their political preference. The prevalence of non-institutional modes of violence such as extortion, murder, and threat in Bangladesh makes it further optimal as a case study. The theory established here contends that political parties encourage violent events in order to gain as much as possible from the situation. Low levels of tolerance and high distrust among political parties and individual



citizens make Bangladesh a fertile place for violence and the optimal selection for a case study.

## **CHAPTER FOUR:**

### **METHODOLOGY, TESTING THE THEORY AND ADDRESSING THEORETICAL CHALLENGES**

Studying political violence is a daunting issue in social science as it involves risk and sensitivity. Moreover, factors such as time constraints, budget and technical capacity have limited the methodology of this study. This research bases its findings on a secondary source for empirical evidence. The original dataset reflects information accumulated by following a vignette method. The quantitative nature of the dataset provides an opportunity to reach conclusions precisely, but it runs the risk of masking nuance which might be important to understanding the overall phenomena. This section begins with a discussion on methodology, followed by the test result. It then addresses the theoretical challenges of studying political violence.

#### **Methodology**

The primary expectation of this study is to collect data using a field survey. The goal here is to assess the theorized connection between relative deprivation and public tendency to condone political violence. As this study is designed to fulfill the requirements of a master's thesis, there are some limitations like time and budget. Considering these limitations, this study is based on a secondary source, a survey conducted by Haque (2019) in Bangladesh. Haque's (2019) dataset is utilized because the survey's questionnaire complies with this study's theoretical requirements, including data on deprivation and violence. The survey contains the same two basic concepts established here: political violence and relative deprivation. Furthermore, the survey's operationalization of these two concepts permits a practical observation of political violence and relative deprivation as variables.

#### **Operational Definition of Political Violence**

Political violence as a term in everyday use is difficult to describe because the concept itself is ideologically loaded and varied between disciplines. Porta (2006) suggests that any physical force to inflict damage can be considered as violence while Graham and Gurr (1969) add that violence can happen to injure people physically as well as to damage their property. Moreover, violence could be intentional or accidental and it can have political aims. Porta specifies the definition of political violence as, “the use of physical force in order to damage a political adversary” (Porta, 2006, p. 2). Violence is divided in two different categories: (i) macro level analysis- collective, state sponsored, or ethnic/group violence, and (ii) micro-level analysis- individual as the center of violence. This study does not concentrate on the macro- analysis of violence but instead focuses on the micro- analysis. The micro- analysis of violence has some adherents in the literature, for example, Gurr (1970) argues that people at the individual level engage in violence when there are gaps between expectations and capabilities, whereas Kornhauser (1959) claims that people who resort to political violence at an individual (micro level) are uprooted socially. However, both Gurr (1970) and Porta (2006) suggest that violence at individual level tends to portray psychological factors. For this study’s purposes, the operational definition of political violence includes any physical torture, verbal abuse and property damage caused by political adversary. This study focuses only on the micro- analysis which includes an individual’s psychology in condoning political violence occurring in proximity to them. Here, political adversary is meant by individual antagonistic psychology caused by contending ideological preferences. However, this study seeks to identify individual attitudes condoning political violence by presenting scenarios that portray both collective- and individual-level violent events. Here, the aim is to determine the psychology behind condoning violence by exposing respondents to some hypothetical violent scenarios.

### **Operational Definition of Relative Deprivation**

Stouffer (1949) introduces the term relative deprivation in a socio-psychological study of American armed forces. He observes dissatisfaction among soldiers based on the assessment of their situation compared to other soldiers. Stouffer consciously studies the non-material aspects of dissatisfaction among soldiers. Relative deprivation as a concept is often confused with relative poverty and relative fulfillment because the basic elements of those concepts are highly mutually exclusive. Townsend suggests that relative deprivation is the feeling of unhappiness caused by social comparison of an individual's "customs and needs" (Townsend, 1979, p. 35). Deprivation scholars have broken down the concept into various categories: absolute-relative, personal-collective and social-economic, etc. Here the focus is on the personal relative deprivation defined by Greitemeyer and Sagioglou (2019) as "being at a disadvantage and perceiving this predicament to be unfair are at the core of the experience of personal relative deprivation" (p.664). The theoretical foundation of this research limits its scope by focusing on relative deprivation induced by political preference. This study moves forward with the operational definition of relative deprivation as the feeling of dissatisfaction among people when their access to public resources is limited due to their political preference.

This study is motivated by scholarly contributions from (i) Collier and Vicente (2013) which addresses how anti-violence campaigns decrease perceptions of violence in low-income democracies, and (ii) McKay and Collard (2003) as they address the best survey practices to understand the issue of deprivation. The above-mentioned literature deploys a vignette method which offers each respondent a short narrative before responding to a question.

### **Design of the Survey**

The primary focus of this study is to investigate how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. It is often challenging to figure out to what extent

people condone political violence, as individuals intrinsically avoid admitting if they support violence publicly. The vignette questionnaire is utilized as a potential method to investigate the tendency to condone violence because it is a method often used by social psychologists when surveying topics that are difficult for the respondent, like drug abuse, alcoholism, sexuality and violence (O'Connor, Davies, Heffernan, & Eijk, 2003). A vignette method follows a procedure to present a hypothetical situation and ask respondents to reveal their attitudes towards a given scenario.

This study's survey has two major sections: (i) the front end of the survey collects data that serves as a proxy for the respondent's deprivation, and (ii) the back end of the survey which consists of the various vignettes and collects answers that are proxies for condoning violence. The primary objective of the vignettes is to encourage participants to replace themselves within the narrative in such a way that their answers can be perceived as an honest insight into what they would do if they have been in a similar situation. The survey includes a random selection process, reaching approximately one hundred and fifty participants. There are no specific occupation brackets for participants but they have to be at least 18 years old to participate in the study.

The appendix here contains these generic questions as well as vignettes which have survey utilizes. It also contains the underlining background and overall thought process behind each vignette. Note that the survey itself is conducted in Bangladesh although the questionnaire has been translated by the author to English.

### **Reviewing Variables**

This study utilizes a dataset which includes some independent variables as well as dependent variables. The list of the independent variable comprises: level of education, access to electric power, money spent on connectivity, number of people sharing a bedroom, leisure and exotic food opportunities in a certain time, tendency to borrow from neighbors,

healthcare affordability, frequency of seeking political help, and time spent on daily travel.

The list for dependent variables contains: attitudes toward condoning violence related to healthcare, police services, government subsidies, judicial service and labor unrest.

This study attempts to understand the correlation between deprivation and the tendency to condone political violence. Different aspects of deprivation that average citizens face in their everyday lives such as accommodation, food, utilities, communication and healthcare have been utilized in the front end (McKay & Collard, 2003). For a respondent to be considered a supporter of violence, he or she has to answer the vignette questions on a given number scale in a way that suggests support for violence. Those scores will then be weighted against their levels of deprivation. For example, one question asks with how many people the respondent has to share their bedroom. The question includes a scale ranging from sharing a bedroom with no one to more than three people. Here it is assumed that any respondent who shares their bedroom with no one is considered not being deprived at all while any respondent who shares a bedroom with more than three people is considered deprived the most. All other respective questions are designed based on a deprivation scale.

However, in terms of calculating the attitudes of condoning political violence, each vignette question presents a scenario which has been responded to by the participants based on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 points. Each vignette is designed to portray a situation with two contending political groups, with one being deprived by the other. In a balanced approach, the vignettes present violent events perpetrated by both groups and the respondents are asked to rank how they will react on the violent event presented before them. To address research biases the survey maker has intentionally avoided asking the respondent about which group's violent event they react positively or negatively toward; rather they are asked simply how they will react to the violent events.

The dataset is coded using 0 to 10 scales. It is assumed that if the respondents choose 0 it means they are following the highest level of condemnation while 10 means the strongest attitude in condoning a violent event. However the range is broken down in five different segments, where 0-1 means a respondent is condemning violence, 2-3 means condemning to some extent, 4-5 means neither condoning nor condemning, 6-7 means condoning to some extent and lastly 8-10 means a respondent condoning very strongly.

### **Testing the Theory: Regression Results and Analyses**

This section presents and interprets the results of the survey data in order to identify the strength of the relationship between perceived deprivation indicators and attitudes of condoning political violence. The dataset is analyzed through several regression models to study the relationship between independent variables (deprivation indicators) and dependent variables (attitudes toward condoning violence). Each regression model is designed to examine multiple independent variables in respect to a dependent variable. Hence, the study has employed several rounds of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with each of the 9 independent and 5 dependent variables of the dataset. The original dataset contains 156 observations in total. The OLS method is expected to produce statistical evidence to determine the relationship between relative deprivation and attitude toward condoning political violence.

In order to analyze the relationship between independent and dependent variables of the dataset, this study runs models using the statistical software, 'R'. The dataset has produced five different models and an additional model combining all. The robustness of each relationship produced by the regression analyses is evaluated here.

**Table 3**

*Models on Deprivation and Violence*

Variable	Model 1: Police	Model 2: Health	Model 3: Agro	Model 4: Judicial	Model 5: Income	All Models
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	Services	Care	Subsidy	Services	Insecurity	Combined
Intercept	0.94 (1.33)	3.24 (1.44)**	1.64 (0.80)**	0.87 (1.12)	4.77 (1.79)***	11.47 (3.82)***
Power cut	0.05 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.08)*	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.27 (0.17)	-0.42 (0.36)
Phone Bill	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Bedroom Share	-0.27 (0.14)*	-0.12 (0.15)***	-0.09 (0.09)	0.04 (0.12)	0.15 (0.19)	-0.28 (0.41)
Leisure	0.00 (0.12)	-0.37 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.55 (0.34)
Exotic Food	0.00 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.24 (0.36)
Borrowing	0.24 (0.12)**	0.25 (0.13)*	0.10 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	0.16 (0.16)	0.75 (0.34)**
Transportation	0.02 (0.21)	-0.37 (0.23)	0.15 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.18)	0.19 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.61)
Private Hospital	-0.01 (0.27)	-0.20 (0.29)	-0.18 (0.16)	0.09 (0.22)	-0.46 (0.36)	-0.75 (0.76)
Political Help	0.17 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.15)	0.08 (0.09)	0.11 (0.12)	0.52 (0.19)***	0.77 (0.41)*

Note: \*\*\*p-value<0.001, \*\*p-value<0.05, \*p-value<0.10.

Each cell represents Coefficient and Standard Error

In the Table 3, the model of condoning violence relating to Police Service, Health Care, Agro Subsidy, Judicial Service and Labor Unrest are fitted on the independent variables Power Cut, Phone Bill, Bedroom Share, Leisure, Exotic Food, Borrowing, Transportation, Private Hospital and Political Help. A combined model of condoning violence is fitted on the same independent variables. The estimated coefficient of all the independent variables and standard errors are presented in the table. To check whether the independent variables have a significant effect on the dependent variables (condoning attitudes of violence) corresponding P-Values are also reported in the table. Overall from the model most of the variables are insignificant. The attached P-Value defines the significance of the data where more than 95% level of confidence is considered robust.

However, Model 1 reveals that Borrowing is significant at 95% level of confidence while Sharing Bedroom is relatively less significant at 90% level of confidence. The other



variables in the model are not significant. Hence, Model 1 expresses that the relationship between sharing a bedroom with more people inversely impacts the attitude of condoning violence. In other words, when a respondent is sharing a bedroom with more people they will more likely condemn the disservice done by the police. Additionally Model 1 shows that borrowing from neighbors positively impacts the attitudes toward condoning violence. Essentially, people who borrow more often are more likely to condone the disservice done by the police.

Model 2 provides more or less the same outcome as Model 1. This model predicts very precisely with a P-Value less than 0.001 that when an individual is sharing his or her bedroom with more people they are less likely to condone political violence related to health care. However, in terms of borrowing from neighbors, the model expresses that a person who borrows more frequently will more likely condone political violence related to healthcare. Although the model shows there is a relationship between borrowing and condoning violence, the robustness of the relationship is low with a P-Value less than 0.10. Moreover, Model 5 achieves one significant relationship among all the variables. It shows that there is a robust relationship (P-Value less than 0.001) between seeking political help and condoning violence related to labor unrest. In other words, when people tend to seek more political help they will likely condone violent attitudes related to labor unrest.

Overall, the combined model shows 95% significant level of confidence when drawing conclusion on the relationship between borrowing from people and tendency to condone political violence. Therefore, when people tend to borrow more, they will more likely condone political violence in general. In summary, the combined regression models show that among the nine determinants of perceived deprivations, borrowing has the greatest influence on attitudes toward condoning political violence. Among the remaining eight determinants, most have limited (more than 5% chance of error) or no statistical significance.

From the regression analyses, it is evident that the perceived relationship between relative deprivation and attitudes toward condoning political violence holds true for only a limited number of variables. Therefore it can be concluded that the dataset does not supply significant evidence to prove the hypothesis. As a result it cannot be said that relative deprivation leads people to condone political violence. There are numerous drawbacks in the dataset which could have contributed to this conclusion. It could be that the conceptual framework lacks essential components to support the hypothesis. Additionally, the small sample size or deficiencies of the field survey could have adversely impacted the findings. The following section analyzes these potential limitations and their effects on the conclusion.

### **Addressing Theoretical Challenges**

The strength of a social science investigation is not limited by how widely it has been accepted within the field but rather by its ability to identify new avenues of research related to the issue. Relative deprivation and political violence is one such theory, first examined by Gurr in the 1970s. Feierabend, Feierabend and Gurr (1972) argue that when there is a “discrepancy between social value expectation and value capabilities,” people become frustrated, “which in turn results in the expression of political violence” (pp. 2-3). There are several criteria that social science scholars utilize to evaluate a theory. One of the commonly accepted ways is to look into the strength of empirical data used as a foundation of the theory. Here, by the scientific foundation, it is established that regardless of time, place, or subject, the theory must be grounded by empirical data that has been collected to verify the assumptions. A question that follows is what to do if the data does not support the theory. Unfortunately, there is no single answer to this question for a social science researcher. One of the reasons could be that social science investigators operate around very subtle nuances of social issues which are often difficult to quantify. For instance, Stephen G. Brush’s (1996) case study on the rise and fall of Gurr's theory of collective violence based on the relative

deprivation provides a historical sketch of Gurr's theory, revealing that there was a spike in the popularity of the theory followed by a downturn when more researchers experimented with empirical data to verify the foundation. Brush's historiographical analysis is based on the initial 15 years with 649 citations: apart from 145 neutral citations, there are 181 favorable and 192 unfavorable citations. As some of the favorable citations turn into unfavorable the proponent himself brings some ad-hoc adaptations into the theory. Some researchers suggest that the original theory holds true in some cases when manipulated while some outright decline the credibility of the theory based on numerical analysis. However, this does not imply that the lack of empirical evidence has led to the rejection of Gurr's theory of deprivation and violence. Many other aspects of the theory are still evaluated within the literature. Nonetheless, Brush (1996) suggests considering the non-empirical aspects of an investigation along with the mechanisms.

The foundation of this research assumes that when people feel relatively deprived they may support political violence. In order to study this relationship, this study borrows a dataset from Haque (2019). The original dataset offers 9 independent variables indicating deprivations and 5 dependent variables offering attitudes of condoning violence. In order to collect evidence for the dependent variables the researcher has applied vignette method. This study is built on the precept that this method helps respondents to place themselves in a hypothetical scenario, but in reality it appears attitudes toward political violence are sensitive and as a result people are reticent to expose themselves publicly even if they condone political violence privately. Therefore, respondents' discomfort with reporting their true sentiments may have impacted the overall outcome of the study. Furthermore, the close-ended nature of the questionnaire may have left no room to accommodate the reasons behind their attitudes towards violence. Finally, the dataset is a small-scale endeavour. Any or all of

these limitations could have contributed to the fact that the variables in the empirical analysis did not achieve statistical significance in support of the hypothesis.

It is recognized that political violence is an inevitable reality for the case country (Bangladesh): from 2001 to 2019 there have been 212,535 violent political incidents reported which includes 207,536 cases of injury and 4,999 murder cases. Moreover, there have been 646 reported incidents of alleged torture by law enforcement agencies from 2004 to 2019 and 1171 reported cases of public lynchings from 2009 to 2019 (Khan A. R., 2020). Population growth puts added pressure on allocation of scarce public resources, further allowing for deprivation to occur. This deprivation is systemic, rooted in the relationship between the incumbent and opposition political parties. The political ideology of Bangladesh is largely divided into two camps: the progressive secular camp and nationalist religious camp (Jahan, 2014). It could be said that the country accounts for the presence of deprivation and violence separately but based on the empirical evidence the relationship is not conclusive. As argued earlier, there are most likely social nuances present in this dynamic which must be accounted for in the empirical data.

Social and behavioral scientists face challenges when assessing any particular behavior conducted by self-report method. This approach has some advantages including no lab requirement, limited ethical challenges and low budget experimentation, but it leaves plenty of room for suboptimal results. According to Lobbestae's investigation, "...aggression is highly socially unacceptable, and therefore particularly likely to be underreported on because of social desirability...additionally, self-report of aggression could be unreliable due to lack of insight" (Lobbestael, 2015, p. 1).

Probably this is likely one of the reasons why laboratory experiments on aggressive behavior are different from the self-report assessment. The current investigation is a self-report assessment which aims to determine the relationship between relative deprivation and

attitude of condoning political violence. The methodology does not permit conducting a controlled experiment in a laboratory. The biggest challenge for this study is how to ask respondents about their attitude on political violence: directly or anonymously. Lobbetae (2015) argues that it will be difficult to measure the actual support for violence by both of these approaches because: (i) for the overt approach, the respondents will be aware of the fact that their positive response will be counted as socially unacceptable, whereas (ii) the covert approach, respondents will not be able to simply place themselves into the presented hypothetical situation.

At this point, it can be concluded that it is challenging but not impossible to study how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. Similar to other sensitive social science issues, accumulating empirical evidence on political violence is difficult because people are reluctant to tell the truth. It is often expensive and time-consuming to reveal the truth. So the best way to mitigate the challenges of a social science research experiment is to provide the investigator the freedom and flexibility necessary to dig deeper into the evidence.

The statistical results do not provide sufficient evidence to claim that relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. However, there may be some points which are obvious but overlooked throughout the study. One of those points may be, for instance, the theoretical absurdity. Gurr, the pioneer of deprivation and violence theory, was criticized after he proposed the theory in the 1970s. Several contemporary scholars have proved that his assumption doesn't hold in several cases. Other limitations with the study may point to the challenges of accumulating data on violence. No one wants to expose their attitude towards violence; even if they support violence because they fear social castigation. Another potential reason may be the limited sample size of the dataset. As violence is a

sensitive issue, 156 observations may be insufficient to determine the relationship between deprivation and violence.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION**

Although the surveyed literature and background details of the case study have provided ample of evidence that political violence is prevalent in Bangladesh, it is inconclusive whether relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. This study has identified limitations which may have affected the overall conclusion of research. This section provides a detailed explanation of those limitations of the study along with recommendations for future research.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The data does not produce statistically significant evidence to corroborate the theory. The lack of evidence is speculated to be the result of a less than perfect match between the hypothesis and the survey designed and implemented by Haque (2019). The following section will discuss why the dataset does not produce evidence and will shed light on the problems that can be addressed if this instrument is to be repurposed for future research.

Section 2 of the survey is meant to capture questions related to deprivation, the key causal factor driving the theory. This section asks several socio-economic questions that are taken as proxies for deprivation, such as the consumption of exotic foods, frequency of vacation or use of comfortable transportation. Here it is required to measure to what extent people are deprived in their daily lives and how these deprivations potentially lead them to condone political violence. There are several suggested changes to redraft the Section 2 questions:

#### **Section 2- Questions on Deprivation:**

Question-1: I feel deprived when I think about what I have compared to what other people like me have (sense of personal deprivation).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

Question-2: In my relationship with others, I can get people to listen to what I say  
(personal sense of power).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

Question-3: I admire people who can afford exotic food, expensive homes, and  
clothes (sense of materialism).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

Question-4: It is difficult to get access to my local elected officer when I am in need  
(political accessibility).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly



Question-5: It is tough for me to get police services if I am in trouble (public service accessibility).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

Question-6: My friend who has political affiliation gets better treatment in the public hospital (health care accessibility).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

Question-7: My colleagues receive more appreciation than me in my workplace (personal sense of appreciation).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

Question-8: My colleagues are well off because they are affiliated with a political party (sense of political affiliation and income).

A: disagree strongly

B: disagree

C: neither agree nor disagree

D: agree

E: agree strongly

The eight questions above are proposed because the majority of the questions will provide more information about how respondents are deprived in various aspects of their lives. Some of the proposed questions have been derived from the scholarly contribution of Kim, Callan, Gheorghiu, and Matthews (2016). For example, the first question asks respondents about their personal relative deprivation: “I feel deprived when I think about what I have compared to what other people like me have.” Here the question has five different options (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and higher values indicate greater personal relative deprivation. The second question is about personal sense of power which is also calculated by the same five options scale. The third question is straight forward to understand how respondents feel deprived in materialistic terms. The fourth, fifth and sixth questions are designed to ask respondents about their perceived deprivation in getting political help and public services like health care, and police services. The last two questions are designed to quantify participants’ sense of deprivation in appreciation and economic terms.

Section 3 is the most important of all three sections. The common problem with each of the vignette questions regards the internalization of the story. The point here is unless the vignettes relate to the respondent’s own life; they will not be sufficiently powerful to make the respondent feel invested in them enough to produce an honest answer. While making more personalistic vignettes may ease the comprehension process for the respondents, this approach can lead to an unbalanced vignette which can undermine the main purpose of the research. This study has some observations on the vignettes borrowed from Haque (2019):

Vignette 1: The goal of this vignette is to disguise the political party's name but to prime the respondents about a series of events that happened during the specified period of 2005 to 2015. The problem here is that people can remember who was in government between 2005 and 2015. Therefore even if the survey maker masks the name of any specific political party, the respondent can easily trace whom the surveyor is trying to suggest based on those years. Moreover, asking general questions may be problematic especially when the majority of respondents have little or no education. For those kinds of respondents, it will be difficult to comprehend the vignette as well as to relate the presented scenarios. It may also be too biased to make the vignette more personalistic because it may result in an unbalanced prompt presentation or may invite more private information that the research shall purposely avoid. Moreover, the original set of vignettes includes a simple scale which cannot measure how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. Sometimes a space to describe things along with the simple numeric response can bring some new dimensions to understand the mechanism. The bottom line here is to figure out if the vignette accurately represents whether people condone violent events when they see relative deprivation. Based on those concerning issues, this study proposes the following improvements:

Imagine a situation where a supporter of the opposition party "X" had land which is the primary source of income for his family. At some point, the land is illegally taken over by one of the supporters of the incumbent political party "Y". As a result, the evicted man goes to the police station to file a case but he is denied any victim support. Being angry, a group of "X" party supporters has beaten up the perpetrator who has illegally held the land. At that time, the supporter of "Y" goes to the police station to file a case against those who have perpetrated the violence and the police have responded by positively filing a charge sheet. Within the next couple of days, all of the perpetrators are arrested and imprisoned for at least

three years. How would one justify the violence done by the group when they are denied victim support? Why would one think that those acts were just or unjust?

Vignette-2: At first glance it may appear easier in this vignette to ask people how they would react toward relative deprivation and to what extent the event has motivated them to condone violence. The outcome after deconstruction may be unacceptable as the minute detail questions may stand out and lead the quality of the responses. For example, the original vignette can be deconstructed into different small questions such as: (I) do you have any history of illness in your life? (II) If yes, then what kind of illness you have? (III) Are you able to treat your illness in private medical centers? (IV) If not have you ever face any difficulty getting treatment at a government hospital (why or why not)? (V) If yes, then what kind of difficulties have you been faced with in those hospitals? (VI) Do you feel these difficulties are somehow related to your political ideology? (VII) Do you think people who support the incumbent government are getting better treatment? (VIII) If yes, then do you think hospital administration and staff are involved in discriminating against people of a different ideology? (IX) If yes, then do you think people who are deprived of their rights to get access to the hospital should have the legitimacy to punish the administration and the staff of the public hospital? (X) Do you believe in your existing judicial system to bring justice? If not, then do you agree that when you get deprived of your rights, you feel vindictive towards those who have deprived you?

So far the best way to ask people about deprivation and support for violence is to present the original vignette and then to ask them the following questions: (I) Are you able to see that one of the patients is relatively deprived? (II) Do you think the violent event driven by deprivation is right/wrong? Explain why or why not.

Vignette 3: This vignette uses a specific year but there should not be any specific electoral cues because that can make people feel that they will be traced based on their

political ideology in the given years. On top of that, the scale needs to be replaced by a set of open-ended questions such as: (I) Do you think one of the farmers is relatively deprived? (II) Do you think the violent event done by the deprived is right or wrong? Why do you believe that?

Vignette 4: This vignette is well crafted but the problem is three characters can make it difficult for respondents to determine how to judge what the police and judiciary have done to the perpetrator. The respondents may misconstrue the question because of the lack of detail in the explanation. The vignette needs to explain how far the verdict strays away from standard criminal law. It should also explain how money and power played an important role to manipulate the verdict. The majority of respondents have not received formal education so it will be difficult for them to differentiate that reciprocal violence is not an act of justice, but rather a digression from the standard judicial decision. On top of that, this vignette is required to explain that direct involvement in any rape case will result in capital punishment, so when a perpetrator gets 2 years of imprisonment instead of capital punishment it is a clear digression of justice coming from the use of money or power. The bottom line is the respondents need to know that, neither reciprocating violence nor a mere two years imprisonment complies with the standard judicial decision even though the political system of the case country promotes revenge violence. In this case, there can be some question at the end of the vignette as: (I) Are you able to see there is a systematic deprivation in terms of justice? (II) Do you think a person who has raped and killed someone deserves to be killed without following the judicial process? The background information is important to let respondent understand the whole situation before they mark on the scale whether they support the reciprocation of violence or not.

Vignette 5: This vignette directly asked the respondent whether they support violence which may potentially result in negation. The question needs to be more individualistic, for

example: think about a place one works for 18 months where one was just paid for 6 months of work and the job provider says they cannot pay the remaining balance. On top of that, one was fired, along with 200 others like oneself. The employer is not paying because of losses but because of a personal craving to accumulate wealth through depriving the labour class. The employer has piled up money, property and power which make one frustrated. For example, within the last year, the employer has bought 5 luxury cars and 8 luxury mansions in the heartland of the country. On top of that, the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission including the customs regulatory authority has charged him for illegal transfer of money into different Swiss banks. One's union leaders have filed a police case against the employer but the local police station refuses to take action against him. In this situation, if one is fired and refuses to pay due bills, would oneself or one's colleagues like the opportunity to punish him? People started demonstrating in front of the office chanting "we want justice". The employer is at the office but his luxury car has been parked outside of the office. There is an immense pressure from the employee so the employer calls the police to help him. When the police batter the angry employees, they become frustrated and set fire to the parked car of their employer. Do you think what the employer has done to his employees and what the employees have done to their employer is proper? If yes, then explain why.

The bottom line is strategic attempts are required when it comes to collecting data on the attitudes towards violence. Several underlying challenges make it difficult for respondents as well as researchers to accumulate conclusive evidence for research. For this survey, one problem is limiting the response options by a numerical scale. Here respondents might have different explanations for why they chose to respond to a particular number of the scale and the number may be the same for several other respondents but their explanation for the same number may be different. Another underlying challenge is most of the questions ask respondents how they would react/valuate certain kinds of violent events. While each

vignette needs to have two important questions: (I) “Do the respondents see that someone in the vignette was relatively deprived?” And (II) “Do they believe the violent event perpetrated by the discriminated individual is right? Explain why or why not.” It is important to understand both questions so that respondents can draw their own conclusions on the connection between relative deprivation and attitudes towards violence.

### **Challenges of Conducting an Open-End Interview**

Based on the suggested changes an open-end interview might help harvest the most nuance from the questions. But there are some challenges in conducting open-end interviews: an open-end interview method will require (i) professional research assistant(s), (ii) research training, (iii) conveyance and accommodation fees and (iv) technical and logistics support. Considering all these obligations to re-conduct 150 open-end interviews, a big budget is required. If this study employs two research assistants and they conduct two interviews a day then it will take 6-7 weeks. Then if those assistants transcribe five interviews a day they will be able to finish transcribing the interviews in 2 weeks. As a result, the whole process will take 9-10 weeks altogether. An open-ended interview approach needs experienced and professional field researcher(s). As this method is not limited to the "yes" or "no" answer options, it needs to collect comprehensive answers with maximum possible nuance related to the research questions. As a result, this study needs to have experienced field researchers who have professional skills and technical capacities to draw out detailed responses from the interviewees. On top of that, the researchers also need to have training on research ethics and compliance because without training and knowledge on the specific issue, the quality of the data collection may be affected. Another important logistical requirement for the project is to have a meeting room for the interview. As the proposed questionnaire suggests having in-depth interviews which might last 2 hours, a meeting room is required to have the best possible outcome.

To sum up, this study needs time, a bigger budget, experienced researchers, and some logistical support to collect empirical evidence from the selected case country. But the problem is this project is undertaken for a master's degree which has limited time with restricted financial support. If there is a bit more time to conduct some pilot in-depth interviews based on the suggested changes, constructive outcomes are expected.

### **Recommendations for the Future Research**

Based on the number of violent events observed it is conclusive that political violence is prevalent in the case country. But the question is: does relative deprivation lead people to condone political violence? If the conclusion were drawn based on the survey data which has been utilized in this study, then the answer is no. However, there are some underlying causes of political violence which should be considered for future research such as:

**Micro-level Analysis of Violence:** Any future research may consider looking into the micro-level analysis of violence based on resource distribution and power utilization. For instance, micro-level violent events happen based on issues like religious practices, access to natural resources like rivers, canals or unclaimed land, and getting government tenders (Moniruzzaman, 2009). The above-mentioned issues sometimes provoke people in such a way that they participate in violent events. For instance, the majority of people in Bangladesh are Muslim and there are two major factions of Islam widely practiced in that country. Often people engage in violent conflict based on the differences of practicing religion and in some cases, that violence surpasses the individual and extends to the village level. These micro-level violent events could provide insight for the condoning of violent events. The relationship between perceived deprivation and attitudes toward condoning political violence may require complements to identify the latent attitudes towards violence. As the majority of the people in Bangladesh are Muslim, new research can lead the deprivation survey by



asking: “Do they feel deprived when practicing Islam and do they feel vindictive when other religious factions impose their thoughts on them?”

Mix Method: Any future research on political violence should strongly consider undertaking a qualitative approach. Quantitative analyses may be easier to calculate and decide on a given hypothesis, but sensitive issues like political violence benefit from the qualitative approach, which more easily reveals the underlying factors to supporting and denying political violence. It is more appropriate if both qualitative and quantitative approaches are undertaken. Furthermore, the survey of this research has limited the response by putting scale for the output which is again easy to calculate but there may be some nuance missed due to utilizing close-ended questions. In this regard, presence of both close-ended and open-ended questionnaires may yield some important details which can be utilized for better comprehension.

## **Conclusion**

This research was initiated to understand how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence assuming that greater deprivation yields a stronger tendency to condone political violence while lesser deprivation garners a lower tendency to condone political violence. But testing the dataset fails to achieve sufficient support for the hypothesis. Based on the empirical data, the relationship between relative deprivation and condoning political violence is inconclusive. However, the study reveals several limitations which may guide future research to addressing the challenges found here. This study speculates that limited research observations, the arguable foundation of the core theory, and the quantitative nature of the study, as well as the ability of the survey maker to deal with a sensitive issue may have impacted the overall result of the study.

Therefore, this study suggests that any future research within the field consider a mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) for field investigation. Additionally, it is

recommended that the survey questionnaire follow an open-ended method to collect the maximum nuance from the respondents. Individual response collection should be accompanied by a few focus group discussions.

## APPENDIX 1.1

### THE ORIGINAL RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

#### Section-1; General Information:

01. Interview Date: \_\_\_\_\_
02. S. No. Interview: \_\_\_\_\_
03. Date of Birth/Age: \_\_\_\_\_
04. Post Office/Code \_\_\_\_\_
05. District: \_\_\_\_\_
06. Gender: \_\_\_\_\_
07. Person conducting interview: \_\_\_\_\_

#### Section-2; Socio-Economic Status:

- 1- How often does the power go out in your house?
- A: More than once a week
- B: Once in a month
- C: Once a week
- D: Once every two weeks
- 2- How much, on average, do you spend on your mobile phone bill per month?
- A: do not own a cell phone
- B: between 0 and 25\$
- C: between 26\$ and 100\$
- D: over 100\$
- 3- How many people do you share a bedroom with?
- A: do not share
- B: one more person

C: two more people

D: over 3

4-How many places did you visit for recreational purposes (at least 100 kilometers away from home) in the last 12 months?

A: no visits

B: once

C: two to four times

D: five times or more

5-How many times have you eaten mutton or lobster in the past week?

A: have not had any in the past week

B: once

C: two to four time

D: five times or more

6-Has your neighbor, or someone you know, asked to borrow food from your household in the past week?

A: no one asked

B: once

C: two to four times

D: five times or more

7-How much time of your day is spent on public transportation in order to get to work?

A: less than twenty minutes

B: between twenty minutes and an hour

C: between an hour and two hours

D: over two hours

8-Think back to the last time you were seen in a private hospital. Please compare that experience to your experience in a public hospital.

- A: Experience in private hospital was better
- B: Experience in public hospital was better
- C: Have never been to a private hospital
- D: Have never been to a public hospital
- E: Have never been to either public or private hospital

9-Have you, or someone you know, approached a politician/elected official to ask for help?

- A: Never
- B: Once
- C: More than once
- D: Often

### **Section-3; Vignette Questions**

1) Imagine a situation when a supporter of a political party "XYZ" was beaten up by some supporters of an incumbent political party "ABC" in 2005 and the victim went to the police station to file a case against the supporter of ABC but denied any victim support. Now think about a supporter of ABC in 2015 who was beaten up by some supporters of incumbent XYZ and the victim went to the same police station but denied to have support. How would react on what the police station do to the victims?

- a) Support strongly
- b) Support to some extent
- c) Neither support nor contradict
- d) Contradict to some extent
- e) Contradict absolutely

2) Now think about a situation where a supporter of the opposition political party, as well as a supporter of the incumbent political party, got the same level of heart disease (for example 79% heart blockage) and both of the patients admitted into the same government-sponsored hospital. As of the rule, the hospital authority is required to offer first come first serve facility. But the patient who was supporting the opposition political party was denied a standard bed rather was offered a floor with limited medical facilities. However, the other patient who was the supporter incumbent political party was offered a standard bed with required medical facilities. Being angry with the situation the family members of the victimized patient beaten up some hospital staff and doctors. In that situation how would you react to the activity done by the relatives of the discriminated patient?

- a) Support strongly
- b) Support to some extent
- c) Neither support nor contradict
- d) Contradict to some extent
- e) Contradict absolutely

3) Again think about a situation where a farmer who had supported the opposition political party in the 2008 election was denied to have government-subsidized fertilizer and irrigation water whereas a farmer who had supported the incumbent political party was offered subsidized fertilizer and irrigation. Now in that condition, if the incumbent supporter yields a huge amount of crops whereas the opposite supporter got nothing. If the victim set fire on the winning farmer how would you react on that?

- a) Support strongly
- b) Support to some extent
- c) Neither support nor contradict
- d) Contradict to some extent

e) Contradict absolutely

4) Last year a group of three incumbent supporters raped and killed a woman. Among the three rapist-killers, one of them was a son of an influencing businessman, other was a son of a member of the parliament (MP) and the last one was a local drug smuggler. During a trial of the case, police killed the drug smuggler in crossfire and thereafter the court sentenced the other two perpetrators with 2 years of imprisonment and charged \$1200 compensation money. What do you think about the verdict of the court and activity of the police?

a) Support strongly

b) Support to some extent

c) Neither support nor contradict

d) Contradict to some extent

e) Contradict absolutely

5) Think about a situation where a local industrialist owned a garment factory where 2200 people work. That industrialist loaned 100 million of BDT to a nationalized bank. As he was facing recurring losses in his business. On top of that, he owed one year salary of his 2200 workers. At that time, he made a plan to flee from Bangladesh with the help of the incumbent political party leader. Somehow the worker's union leaders came to know his plan and asked all 2200 workers to punish him. So when he refused the workers to pay their salary, all 2200 workers slapped and kicked him until his death. How would you evaluate what the workers did to their employer?

a) Support strongly

b) Support to some extent

c) Neither support nor contradict

d) Contradict to some extent

e) Contradict absolutely

## **APPENDIX 1.2**

### **RATIONALE OF THE SURVEY**

#### **Section-2 of the Survey**

The field study is concerned that there could be some people in the survey population who had never felt deprived of their need in the public sector because they can afford a private hospital, schools and economic opportunities. So the section-2 questions will help the investigator to determine the social and economic statuses of the participant. It is expected that those simple but powerful questions will simplify the process to analyze the relationship between deprivation and tendency to condone.

#### **Section-3 of the Survey**

Vignette-1: To hammer on the thought process of the research participants, this vignette has added two specific periods. The reason is in 2005 there was government led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which has different political and ideological goals than the 2015's political party Bangladesh Awami League (BAL). The main purpose of this vignette is to ask a balanced question to find out attitudes of the participants when access to justice comes against and in favour of their preferred political party. The mechanism here is, if the respondents support the denial of access to justice for the supporter of their opposite political ideologue then it can be concluded that the respondent will condone violence perpetrated against their opposition. The plot of this vignette was drawn from Human Rights Watch reports published in 2018.

Vignette-2: the second vignette is designed to understand how people are politically sensitive on basic issues like health care. The survey maker wants to see whether people condone violence even if there are ways to avoid it. This vignette presents a situation when the contending political parties' decision was wrong and the survey maker wants to see how respondents justify the activity. If the respondents appreciate what has been done to the



healthcare provider then it is conclusive that the respondent will condone political violence. The actual scenario is compiled from the event happening every day in Bangladesh. Government hospitals have limited seats as because these are offered at literally free of cost. For example Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) government is in power now so if some political supporter of BAL gets sick they could easily get hospitalized at free of cost while if any supporter of leader of the opposition party gets sick then they might have been hospitalized at free of cost if there is plenty of seats available. Distribution of seats in the hospital is not first come first serve basis, this is based on political affiliation and linkage with the leader in power.

Vignette-3: this vignette is designed to delegate a situation where both parties are victimized by each other. Government is responsible to offer subsidized fertilizer equally and fairly to the farmers. But often time it is observed that party in power become bias to distribute fertilizer among their supporters. For example, Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) is in power now so the government defined distribution channel will put a bracket for those who are no BAL supporter. The survey maker targets to look into the outcome on how participants react on each injustice happened among them. Both of these parties did wrong but the point is to understand how respondents condone the perpetration of political violence.

Vignette-4: this vignette is a bit different from the other vignette because the other vignette presents two contending political parties' activity but this vignette presents only one. In this vignette, we wanted to see how people expose their attitudes towards a judicial crisis. Because the survey maker wants to know how people relate violence in general, do they condone violence all the time or they stand against when there is a judicial crisis. In 2018 and 2019 there had been two murder cases which Awami League government had intentionally put a rug on the issue because the driver of those murder and rape case was the big shot political leader of Awami League government.

Vignette-5: While the other vignettes are designed to understand tendency to condone violence at individual level this vignette is designed to understand collective tendency. Mob lynching is a frequent violent event in Bangladesh. This vignette specifically targets to calculate the attitude of respondent when they see rightful labor movement turning into a violent event. Playing with the political economy in Bangladesh is just a matter of daily affairs. The big shot businessmen who use to invest during the election campaign once their party comes in power they start pulling out their investment with a huge amount of interest. Those businessmen have big hand over government decision and the policy the government takes. Having control over the political system, businesses want to make substandard pay-scale for their workers. They also enjoy a big amount of loans from the government bank and sometimes don't pay their loan at all.

## **APPENDIX 1.3**

### **CODE BOOK**

Vignette response code: the vignettes are designed to measure how people support or condemn certain kind of violence. The range starts from 0 to 10 scales, where 0 means the most condemnation and 10 mean the most support offered by the respondent. Here the range between 0-1 means the respondent is absolutely condemning the violence, from 2-3 it means condemning to some extent, 4-5 means neither support nor condemn, 6-7 means support to some extent and lastly 8-10 it means the respondent support strongly.

01. Intd- Interview date

02. InNo- Interview number, skip it if unknown

03. InPpl- Interviewer's name, skip if unknown

04. Ag- What is your approximate age?

05. BPlace- What is your birthplace (district's name)?

06. PCode- What is the post code of your place of birth?(please skip if forgotten)

07. PStn- Which Police Station your birthplace belongs to?

08. Edu- What is the highest level of education you received?

I. Ascribed values: 12-undergrad= 16

II. 6th to 8th Standard= 8

III. 9th to 10th Standard= 10

IV. Didn't receive any schooling= 0

V. 1st to 5th Standard= 5

VI. Graduate to beyond= 18

VII. 10th to 12th Standard=12

09. HPwr- How often does the power go out in your house?

Ascribed values:

- I. More than once a week= 8
- II. Once in a month= 1
- III. Once a week= 4
- IV. Once every two weeks= 2

10. PBill- How much, on average, do you spend on your mobile phone bill per month?

Ascribed values:

- I. Over 300-400bdt
- II. Between 100 to 300- 200
- III. Do not own a cell phone-0
- IV. Between 0 and 100 BDT-100

11. HShare- How many people share your residence?

- I. Ascribed values: Do not share-1
- II. One more person-2
- III. Two more people-3

12. PlsVst- How many places did you visit for recreational purposes (at least 100 kilometers away from home) in the last 12 months?

Ascribed value:

- I. Two to four times-4
- II. No visits-0
- III. Once-1

13. ExoFood- How many times have you eaten mutton or lobster in the past week?

Ascribed values:

- I. Have not had any in the past week-0
- II. Two to four time-4
- III. Five times or more-6

14. BrwNgbr- Has your neighbor, or someone you know, asked to borrow food (for example: sugar, rice, milk and/or potato) from your household in the past week?)

Ascribed values:

- I. One come once-1
- II. No one asked- 0
- III. Two to four time-4
- IV. Five times or more-6

15. Transp- How much time do you spend on local public transportation in order to get to work from home?

Ascribed values:

- I. Between an hour and two hours-2
- II. Less than twenty minutes -0.5
- III. I don't use any local transportation-0
- IV. Over two hours- 3

16. PvtHspt- Think back to the last time you were seen in a private hospital. Please compare that experience to your experience in a public hospital.

Values set:

- I. Experience in private hospital was better-3
- II. Experience in public hospital was better-2
- III. Have never been to either public or private hospital-0
- IV. Have never been to a public hospital-0
- V. Experience in the public and private hospital is the same-1

17. AppHelp- Have you, or someone you know, approached a politician/ leader or elected official to ask for help?

- I. Never-0

II. More than five times-6

III. Two to four time-4

IV. Five times or more-6

18. v1PoliceAct: vignette on access to police station

19. v2Treatment: access to hospitalization

20. v3Subsidy: violence for subsidy

21. v4Justice: violence for access to justice

22. v5Industry: based on labor wage

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